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Abstract: 
The principles characterizing the traditional revenue-expense approach to accounting have 
never been “invented.” They are an institution that is the result of social evolution, not of 
human design. Therefore, the efforts to defend them against the balance sheet approach 
endorsed by standard-setters have encountered severe difficulties. The latter is based on a 
coherent model of the economy, namely neoclassical economics. This paper argues that a 
solid basis for explaining the rationale of the traditional accounting principles can be found in 
behavioral economics, especially in Prospect Theory. If one combines this result with a 
market process view of the economy, the revenue-expense approach turns out to be congenial 
to the organization of the market economy.     
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1970s, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which later became the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), have gradually been trying to develop and enforce 
accounting standards that contrast strongly with the historically evolved accounting principles 
(Ijiri 2005: 261). For many and diverse reasons, the displacement of the old principles has 
been criticized severely.  In a series of recent papers, Dickhaut et al. (2010), Dickhaut et al. 
                                                            
1 The author wishes to thank professors Mathias Erlei and Thomas Schildbach for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper.  
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(2009), and Dickhaut (2009) try to provide new arguments against the abolishment of these 
principles in favor of those advocated by the two main accounting standard-setters. They 
show that the most important traditional accounting principles, namely conservatism and 
revenue realization, are compatible with the results of neuroscience. These culturally evolved 
principles, they argue, must have a deeper meaning as they can be rediscovered in the logic of 
the human brain. 
The present paper substantiates this claim. Indeed, there is more behind the traditional 
accounting principles than mere tradition. However, the case made by the late Dickhaut and 
his co-authors seems to be a little far-fetched. For example, they assume links between the 
unconscious counting behavior of apes and the logic of double-entry bookkeeping. Behavioral 
economics provides a more down-to-earth playing field than neuroscience for those who look 
for instances where the logic of accounting principles pops up in relevant contexts.     
The main thesis of this paper is that financial accounting, if conducted according to the 
traditional accounting principles, conforms to established results of behavioral economics. 
The argument proceeds in two steps. First, in chapter 3, a relationship between the traditional 
principles and behavioral economics is established. The standard-setters dismiss the 
traditional accounting principles because they cannot be reconciled with the normative 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. It is shown that even those schools of thought which 
usually are opposed to modern neoclassicism have contributed to this dismissal (3.1). 
However, the traditional accounting principles do conform to the results of behavioral 
economics. They are in line with human behavior as found in numerous laboratory and field 
experiments. This paper concentrates on Prospect Theory, an experimentally cemented theory. 
It provides a background against which the principles can be interpreted in a new way. The 
traditional revenue-expense framework can be reconciled with this theory whereas the balance 
sheet approach endorsed by the standard-setters cannot be so (3.2). The sunk cost argument 
that is often brought up against the traditional way of accounting is also weakened by 
Prospect Theory and subsequent experiments. People do not forget about sunk costs, as 
neoclassical decision theory assumes, but keep them in mind. The same is done in classical 
accounting. Historical costs are not forgotten but kept track of in the balance sheet (3.3). 
Furthermore, the asymmetrical value function developed in Prospect Theory is consistent with 
the accounting principle of conservatism (3.4).  
Apparently, the traditional accounting principles align the behavior of enterprises to the 
behavior of human beings. As long as businesses practice accounting according to traditional 
principles they determine performance figures in a way that conforms to human behavior as 
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revealed in numerous experiments. In a second step, chapter 4 explains why these principles, 
although conforming to modes of behavior that violate rationality as postulated by 
neoclassical economics, have nonetheless won through in the evolution of social institutions. 
Based on the research conducted by Vernon Smith, it is demonstrated that the behavioral 
assumptions of neoclassical economics are not necessary for a market economy to find its 
equilibrium state; under certain conditions, they might even be detrimental for the 
coordination of the market actors (4.1). That the traditional accounting rules have evolved 
might therefore be a signal for their ecological rationality. As institutions that developed as a 
result of human action, but not human design, they probably follow a rationale that is not 
known or understood by anybody of their applicants (4.2). It seems probable that the 
traditional accounting principles rest upon rules of conduct which ensured the survival of our 
ancestors and which therefore might also increase the probability of surviving on the market. 
Furthermore, the fact that the traditional accounting principles are not in line with neoclassical 
economics makes them all the more reasonable from a market process point of view. The 
coordination function of the market does not necessitate the participants to have complete or 
perfect, but only private information in terms of Hayek (1945) (4.3).   
The paper starts out, in chapter 2, with a short presentation of the two visions of accounting 
that are relevant for the following discussion: the traditional view and the one endorsed by the 
standard-setters.  
 
2. Two approaches to the function of accounting 
Financial accounting, as was argued by Werner Sombart, Max Weber, Ludwig von Mises, and 
Joseph Schumpeter, is a central – if not the defining – institution of the market economy or 
capitalism (Waymire and Basu 2007: 3). Accordingly, the roots of accounting, as it is known 
today, go back to medieval Italy where, in 1494, Luca Pacioli wrote the first complete 
description of double-entry bookkeeping as practiced in the prospering Italian cities at his 
time (Hatfield 1965: 6 ff; Zan 1994: 263).  
In the last 150 years, the way this ancient and essential institution is approached by academics 
and politics has changed fundamentally. Whereas in earlier times the role of accounting 
research and commercial legislation was to describe and establish what actual sound 
accounting practices were, without actively interfering, the trend is towards the enforcement 
of accounting principles that run contrary to age-old traditions. In the 19th century, this trend 
showed itself markedly in the newly founded German Reich where, in 1870, the German 
Commercial Law abolished the established historical cost rule and instead imposed what 
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today would be called fair value accounting. After having been realized that this step severely 
increased the exuberance and the frauds that preceded the crisis of 1873, the law was changed 
again and the traditional rules came to their own once more (Braun 2014). During the last 
forty years, the trend towards the authoritative establishment of mandatory accounting 
principles has gathered pace (Biondi 2011: 2). Especially since the foundation of the FASB 
and the IASC the traditional principles are shrinking in importance and are, bit by bit, 
replaced by designed principles. 
Although there are a lot of detailed changes that deserve closer treatment, this paper focuses 
on the big picture, that is, on the fundamental difference between the traditional accounting 
principles and the ones that are designed by the two big standard-setters. This difference 
shows up in the way the very function of accounting is interpreted. There are basically two 
alternative approaches (Dichev 2008: 454). The traditional accounting rules evolved in a way 
that made them fit to determine the profit of the bookkeeping entity. First and foremost, 
Eugen Schmalenbach ([1919] 1959; see also Dichev 2008: 455) worked out this relation. He 
argued that the one central function of accounting, if accomplished according to the 
traditional historical cost principle, is to determine the success of the company by contrasting 
incurred expenses and collected revenues, and he concluded that, therefore, the income 
statement must be seen as the decisive document in accounting (Schmalenbach [1919] 1959: 
32). The balance sheet, on the other hand, where the assets and liabilities are stated, only has a 
subordinate function. It has become necessary because most enterprises, especially since the 
industrial revolution, are going concerns, not one-shot undertakings with a foreseeable date of 
liquidation. For going concerns which pay out profits to their owners on a regular basis, and 
not only at the time of liquidation, it is necessary to keep away from the income statement all 
transactions that have not yet been completed, that is, for which profit cannot yet be 
determined. This includes most notably current expenses that are supposed to give rise to 
revenues in the future and current revenues that imply expenses in the future. Thus the 
balance sheet, as interpreted by Schmalenbach (1959: 55), serves as a store for the income 
statement. It contains, to give a short example, the historical expenses that have been made for 
a durable machine. These only enter the income statement over the years, as depreciations, 
while the machine wears off. This traditional view of accounting will be referred to as the 
revenue-expense approach. 
The standard setters, in contrast, adhere to the so-called balance sheet approach (Perry and 
Nölke 2006: 563), also called asset-liability approach. The main purpose of accounting, 
according to this view, is to provide useful and relevant information to the capital market, i.e., 
5 
 
mainly to potential investors (Barth 2006: 272; Hitz 2007: 327). Therefore, in the view of 
accounting that the standard-setters are propagating and enforcing, the balance sheet is the 
crucial document. It contains – or is supposed to contain – useful information concerning the 
financial position of the company. It should ideally provide the “fair value” of all assets and 
liabilities of the respective company. Fair value accounting thus is an outflow of the more 
general balance sheet approach (Hitz 2007: 328). The fair value of assets and liabilities is 
supposed to provide information on the present value of the respective items. According to 
IAS 36 (BCZ 11 (a)), “fair value reflects the market’s expectation of the present value of the 
future cash flows.” IFRS 13 adds that fair value is the “price that would be received to sell an 
asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date” (Cairns 2014: 131). In short, “fair value” basically means the present 
value of the cash flows that the items in the balance sheet are going to produce and for which 
the price in an efficient market is the best proxy (Barlev and Haddad 2003: 397). Should 
market prices not exhibit sufficient quality or not be available, standard-setters require using 
(modified) market prices of comparable items, where comparability naturally refers to the 
cash flow profile. When marking-to-market should happen to be impossible, as a technique of 
last resort the fair value is mandated to be estimated using internal estimates and calculations 
(marking-to-model) (Hitz 2007: 326 f.). To sum up, the balance-sheet is not interpreted as a 
store for the income statements, but as a device that contains forecasts of future cash-flows.  
As for the standard-setters the main purpose of accounting is to inform the capital market, the 
old revenue-expense view is rejected. A balance sheet based on historical costs does not 
provide a fair picture of the “real financial position” of a firm (Barlev and Haddad 2003: 384-
387). Further, according to the balance sheet approach, income only plays a derived role 
(Dichev 2008: 454). It is the difference between the present value of the company’s net assets 
– as determined by the fair value balance sheet – at the beginning of the period and their value 
at the end of the period (Barth 2006: 272; Rayman 2007: 217). So the balance sheet is no 
longer the “servant” of the income statement but, rather conversely, the income statement is 
only a correlate of the balance sheet. 
 
3. Prospect Theory and its relationship to accounting principles   
3.1 The neoclassical roots of the current standards 
Economics and accounting have cross-fertilized each other for a long time. Originally, it was 
economics that took over many important concepts, like ‘capital,’ ‘costs,’ and ‘revenues,’ 
from accounting practices (Klamer and McCloskey 1992; Chiapello 2008). However, roughly 
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since the 1960’s, the direction of influence has reversed (Dillard 2008). Concerning its 
method, modern accounting research is oriented towards the positive research program which 
was advanced by Milton Friedman and which put its mark on modern economics (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). Unsurprisingly, positive accounting research originated mainly from 
Chicago where Friedman and his adherents were working (Christenson, 1983; Williams, 
2003). With the rise of the new method, also crucial concepts like the efficient market 
hypothesis and Walrasian general equilibrium entered accounting research from economics, 
mostly via financial economics (Williams E. et al. 1980: 133-135).  
It has been noted many times that the balance sheet approach to accounting, and especially the 
concept of fair value, are based on neoclassical economics (Hitz 2007: 327, 332). Especially 
John Hicks’ (1946) discussion of income is used as a reference point by standard-setters 
(Bromwich et al. 2010: 350). They explicitly aim at John Hicks’ income concept N° 1 (Barth 
2006: 280) which is often also called “economic income” (Solomons 1961: 375 f.). Hicksian 
Income N° 1 is 
 
the maximum amount which can be spent during a period if there is to be an 
expectation of maintaining intact the capital value of prospective receipts (in money 
terms) (Hicks 1946: 173).   
 
This concept of income clearly gives priority to the balance sheet and the valuation of assets 
and liabilities. According to Bromwich et al. (2010: 351; see also Solomons 1961: 376), 
Hicksian Income N° 1 is the difference between the firm value (net present value of a firm’s 
future cash flows) at the end of a period and the firm value at the beginning of the period plus 
the dividends distributed between those dates. Thus income is only a derivative of the 
determination of the present value of the firm’s assets and liabilities.2 
It should be clear, however, that neoclassical concepts and theories, methodologically 
following the paradigmatic essay of Friedman (1953), do not and are not supposed to rest 
upon realistic assumptions. If one promotes Hicksian Income N° 1 as the “correct” income 
concept, as standard-setters do, one actually has to assume perfect competition, perfect 
information, and rational actors, to name the most relevant ones. In other words, it must be 
assumed that the market is efficient and actually in an equilibrium situation (Hitz 2007: 332). 
Otherwise, the present value of the firm’s assets and liabilities could not be determined – nor 
even defined – in a meaningful way, which is admitted even by adherents of the fair-value 
                                                            
2 It must be noted that John Hicks himself was not calling for the use of this income concept in accounting. As 
shown in detail by Brief (1982), he actually was in favor of a valuation according to historical cost. 
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program (Barlev and Haddad 2003: 405 f.). Therefore, in adopting the neoclassical 
framework, standard-setters also accept the latter’s focus on equilibrium analysis.   
It is interesting to note at this point that the demand for the balance sheet approach and fair 
value, when it comes to accounting, is shared even by schools of thought which otherwise 
decidedly criticize the equilibrium approach of neoclassical theory. This might explain why 
there has been little fundamental criticism of the new approach to accounting from academic 
economics: even the opponents of neoclassic theory are quite neoclassical so far as accounting 
is concerned. 
Ludwig von Mises, who was one of the central figures of Austrian Economics in the 20th 
century and who vehemently stressed the importance of the market process as against the 
neoclassical restriction to equilibrium (Kirzner 1997: 61 f.), held a rather neoclassical view of 
accounting. He rejected the old business customs and the traditional provisions of commercial 
law because they “have brought about a deviation from sound principles of accounting” 
(Mises 1966: 213). Instead, he advocates an accounting income concept which pretty much 
resembles Hicksian Income N° 1: 
 
In balance sheets and in profit-and-loss statements the result of past action becomes 
visible as the difference between the money equivalent of funds owned (total assets 
minus total liabilities) at the beginning and at the end of the period reported, and as the 
difference between the money equivalent of costs incurred and gross proceeds earned. 
In such statements it is necessary to enter the estimated money equivalent of all assets 
and liabilities other than cash. These items should be appraised according to the prices 
at which they could probably be sold in the future or, as is especially the case with 
equipment for production processes, in reference to the prices to be expected in the 
sale of merchandise manufactured with their aid (Mises 1966: 212 f.).        
 
In this passage, obviously both the balance sheet approach and the fair value concept shine 
through. Mises point of view is especially important because of his influence on Raymond 
Chambers. Chambers is sometimes referred to as the father of fair value – although this 
probably is an exaggeration (Gaffikin 2012; Barlev and Haddad 2003: 390). In any case, he 
was a very influential accounting theorist in the 20th century strongly putting emphasis on the 
rationale of fair value accounting. His magnum opus, Chambers (1966), not only quotes 
Mises more often than any other economist, but reminds of Mises both because of its 
deductive approach and its multidisciplinarity. Consequently, Chambers’s (1966: 112-115) 
discussion of income as the change of the value of net assets between two points of time is 
clearly based on Mises (1966: 212-214).        
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Ronald Coase might be mentioned as another famous critic of neoclassical theory – and 
especially of its extensive use of unrealistic assumptions (Medema 2008: 432-435) – who was 
nonetheless quite neoclassical when it came to accounting. In Coase (1990: esp. 8) he 
explains how he and his young colleagues at the London School of Economics in the 1930s 
were fighting against accountants in order to establish their new opportunity cost concept in 
accounting. In accounting, of course, the opportunity cost of an asset is its exit value, that is, 
the price for which it could be sold on the market – and thus its fair value (Ronen 2008: 186; 
see also Buchanan 1999: 26-29).  
To sum up, the standard-setter’s vision of accounting is based upon neoclassical economics. 
What is more, even other notable schools of economics do not oppose this vision so that it is 
no wonder that accounting has been a victim of economic – better: neoclassical – imperialism. 
There was no elaborated alterative framework available. 
 
3.2 Prospect Theory and the Balance Sheet Approach 
The assumptions of neoclassical economics have been attacked since they have been 
formulated for the first time. In the second half of the 20th century they have increasingly 
come under fire from the then new field of behavioral economics. Psychologists and 
economists showed that real people making actual decisions do not choose in accordance with 
rational choice theory. One of the most notable contributions in this regard, and one that is 
especially relevant for our discussion of accounting principles, was Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). It provided conclusive evidence that the majority of people 
does not act according to the Expected Utility Theory. In their classical paper, Kahneman and 
Tversky argue that human valuations do not relate to final states of wealth, as in Expected 
Utility Theory, but to changes in wealth. 
 
[P]eople normally perceive outcomes as gains and losses, rather than as final states of 
wealth or welfare. Gains and losses, of course, are defined relative to some neutral 
reference point. The reference point usually corresponds to the current asset position, 
in which case gains and losses coincide with the actual amounts that are received or 
paid (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 274).      
     
These “departures from expected utility theory,” they (1979: 277) add, must lead to 
“normatively unacceptable consequences, such as inconsistencies, intransitivities, and 
violations of dominance.”  
From the way they formulated their point, however, something different can be also inferred. 
The balance sheet approach to accounting, whereas it is compatible with neoclassical 
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economics, seems to run contrary to the empirically derived Prospect Theory. For individuals, 
final states of wealth are not “carriers of value” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 277). Human 
behavior, in other words, is not consistent with Hicksian Income. The latter interrelates two – 
independently valuated – states of wealth (i.e., the net values of all assets), the difference 
being income. Apparently, this way of calculating income is different from what Prospect 
Theory shows for actual human decisions. According to this, the asset position at the 
beginning serves as a reference point. Gains and losses are “the amounts of money that are 
obtained or paid” (Kahnemann and Tversky 1979: 286), not the difference between the 
current asset position and a future one.  
Rather, Prospect Theory is compatible with the traditional revenue-expense approach to 
accounting. By calculating with historical cost, this approach creates a reference point in the 
balance sheet: the amount of money that has already been invested in the company. This 
amount is not valuated anew every period but, depreciations aside, stays the same. Income is 
created when, starting from this amount of wealth in the balance sheet, the money inflows are 
larger than the outflows. Thus the comparison between Prospect Theory and the revenue-
expense approach tells us that the latter might actually be an adaptation to the way humans 
evaluate the gains and losses of their actions. It could be interpreted as a translation of human 
behavior to the institution of economic calculation.       
 
3.3 The role of the endowment effect and sunk costs 
Richard Thaler (1980) elaborated on Prospect Theory in order to demonstrate further failures 
of neoclassic economic theory to describe and predict behavior. Among other things, he built 
upon an old result of social psychology that Kahneman and Tversky had integrated into their 
theory. It had been shown that human decision-makers weigh losses higher than gains. “The 
aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the 
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount” (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 279). 
Thaler’s (1980) subsequent discussion of sunk costs and the endowment effect backs the 
argument of the last section.  
According to economic theory, all costs are opportunity costs. The cost of any decision is 
supposed to be the highest valued opportunity forgone. The out-of-pocket costs, i.e. direct 
outlays of cash, do not have any independent meaning as they are interpreted as opportunity 
costs as well – the highest valued opportunity that would have been obtainable with the cash 
given away. As indicated in section 3.1, the depiction of opportunity costs in the balance sheet 
is a more or less explicit ideal of the fair value program. Thaler (1980: 44), however, points 
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out that, in real life, decisions are influenced by the endowment effect. It makes a difference to 
people whether they only need to choose between two options, e.g. between a bottle of wine 
and $5, or whether they actively have to give away one option, e.g. when they have to pay $5 
for a bottle. The fact that they are “endowed” with the $5 makes them more reluctant to 
choose the bottle of wine although, from the standpoint of economic theory, the decisions 
seem to be the same. Thaler (1980: 44) argues that this observation can be explained by 
means of Prospect Theory. Starting from the reference point, that is, from the actor’s initial 
endowment with assets, out-of-pocket costs are viewed as losses (and therefore felt intensely) 
whereas opportunity costs are viewed as foregone gains (and therefore felt more mildly). This 
explains why out-of-pocket costs loom larger than opportunity costs. 
Obviously, “out-of-pocket costs” is just a different name for “historical costs.” Historical 
costs in the balance sheet document what has been invested in the firm so far. They could also 
be called the “endowment” of the firm. So, although the endowment should play no role in 
decision-making, according to neoclassical theory, they actually are important in real-life 
decisions. And the traditional accounting principles do nothing else than to accept this 
empirical fact and translate it to the firm level. 
Thaler’s (1980) discussion of sunk costs underlines this parallel. He explicitly states: 
 
Economic Theory implies that only incremental costs and benefits should affect 
decisions. Historical costs should be irrelevant (Thaler 1980: 47, emphasis changed).  
 
Based on the observation of human behavior, however, he suggests that economic theory is 
not descriptive in this point. Instead, he offers an alternative hypothesis. Costs that have been 
incurred in the past are not irrelevant to the present.  
 
[P]aying for the right to use a good or service will increase the rate at which the good 
will be utilized, ceteris paribus. This hypothesis will be referred to as the sunk cost 
effect (Thaler 1980: 47, emphasis erased).  
 
Interestingly, Thaler (1980) draws on metaphors taken from accounting when he explains this 
effect. Sunk costs, he says, are not felt as pain at the time when they are incurred. Instead they 
are memorized in the “individual’s psychic account system” until the moment comes when 
the corresponding revenues accrue (Thaler 1980: 48; Thaler 1999: 190-192 reports supporting 
experimental evidence). Only then the net gain or net pain is felt. He uses the example of a 
family who pays $40 for baseball tickets. He argues that no pain or pleasure will be felt at the 
moment of purchase. Only when the day of the game arrives will there be a comparison 
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between the $40 and the pleasure derived from watching the game with the family feeling 
“net pleasure” (Thaler 1980: 49). The similarities between his findings and traditional 
accounting are so apparent that Thaler himself cannot but recognize them.  
 
3.4 Prospect Theory and Conservatism 
Basu (2009: 15) and Dickhaut et al. (2010: 243), in their discussion of the relevance of 
Neuroscience for accounting theory, already shortly highlight another aspect of Prospect 
Theory. They state that the asymmetry between gains and losses which shows up in human 
behavior strongly reminds of the accounting principle of conservatism. Conservatism, the 
principle according to which the accountant anticipates no profits but all losses, goes back at 
least to the 15th century (Basu 1997: 7 f.) and has easily been integrated in revenue-expense 
accounting. Its best-known outflow is the valuation according to ‘cost or market, whichever is 
lower.’ Whereas critics of conservatism have stressed its “potential to garble earnings due to 
the asymmetry in the treatment of revenues and expenses”, and thus its irrational character, its 
supporters have often claimed that conservatism in accounting is simply a matter of prudence 
(Harris et al. 1994: 191). It saves companies from distributing too high dividends.  
Yet, it seems probable that conservatism is more than a mere ad hoc prudence device. As 
Prospect Theory shows, humans generally evaluate gains and losses differently. Losses loom 
larger than gains, and therefore it seems sensible to treat them asymmetrically. The rule of 
conservatism reflects this asymmetry. In accordance with the fact that losses are felt 
intensively, conservatism demands that losses are recognized in the income statement as soon 
as they are anticipated. In other words, impending losses loom larger in the income statement 
than expected profits. Because of the accounting principle of conservatism, the company 
“perceives” gains and losses in a similar way ordinary humans do.  
 
4. The ecological rationality of the traditional accounting principles 
4.1 Ecological and constructivist rationality      
So far, the parallel between the traditional way of practicing accounting and the way humans 
behave has been stressed. Apparently, the age-old accounting principles are closer to 
behavioral economics than to neoclassical economics. This result seems a little awkward. 
Many competent commentators regard accounting as a central institution of the market 
economy, and the modelling of the economic laws of the market is the main purpose of 
neoclassical economics, not of behavioral economics, at least not to the same extent. A major 
aim of economists in the latter tradition even seems to be the critique of the unrealistic 
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assumptions their neoclassic colleagues have to make in order to be able to deduce these laws 
(Smith, V. 2005: 144). So why do the traditional accounting rules nonetheless not conform to 
the neoclassical assumptions but to the behavior as described by behavioral economics?  
The following argument can be divided in two parts. First of all, it is argued that the working 
of the market is not captured by basing the modelling on the unrealistic assumptions of 
neoclassic theory. Therefore, also the rationale of accounting as part of the market process 
cannot be well understood by neoclassical theorists, both in economics and accounting 
(section 4.1). The second part of the argument is concerned with the question as to why the 
traditional accounting principles have turned out the way they have. Apparently, they 
historically won through in competition with other principles because they better guaranteed 
the survival of the applying firms (section 4.2). Section 4.3 finally combines both parts of the 
argument and indicates fruitful research directions for the future.    
Vernon Smith’s research program, outlined in his Nobel Lecture and later extended to a book 
(Smith V. 2003; 2008), provides an appropriate starting point for the following discussion. He 
distinguishes two forms of rationality. The first form is the conscious form of rationality that 
he calls constructivist rationality. It applies when a result is purposefully brought about by the 
action of an agent or an acting body. Behind constructivist rationality is the idea that “all 
worthwhile institutions were and should be created by conscious deductive processes of 
human reason” (Smith 2008: 26).           
The second form is ecological rationality. Smith (2008) argues that, sometimes, and 
especially in social contexts, the rationality of an outcome is not the consequence of a rational 
plan, but the unintended outcome of decentralized actions and interactions of unsuspecting 
individuals. In these cases, the rationality is due to the environment where the decisions are 
made and where they unfold their consequences.  
The most characteristic example of ecological rationality in economics can be found in 
Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. Every bee in Mandeville’s hive is motivated by vices 
like prodigality, luxury, fickleness, envy, and vanity, to name just a few. Nonetheless, the hive 
thrives as every vice is the source of well-being for the other bees. This idea culminates in the 
well-known line: 
 
The worst of all the Multitude     
Did something for the Common Good.  
 
Mandeville’s bee-society which, of course, is a metaphor for the developing market economy 
of the early 18th century, prospers although, first, no central authority directs and coordinates 
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the actions of the particular bees and, second, the bees themselves do not think about the 
common good but are driven by their egoistic vices. The “rational” result depends, instead, on 
the environment. For Vernon Smith (2008: 16 ff.), it is clear that it is the implementation and 
enforcement of property rights which make the coordination of individual actions without a 
central coordinator possible. 
The idea of ecological rationality found its most famous expression in Adam Smith’s Invisible 
Hand: It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest (Book I, Ch. 2). Every individual is  
 
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it 
always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest 
he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it (Book IV, Ch. 2).  
 
So the rationality of the Invisible Hand is not an intended rationality. The promotion of the 
interest of society is rather an unintended outcome of actions that aim at completely different 
goals. Vernon Smith (2008: 18, emphasis by Smith) summarizes the key proposition of the 
Scottish philosophers the following way: “To do good for others does not require deliberate 
action to further the perceived interest of others.”  
In numerous market experiments, Vernon Smith has shown that the rational outcome of 
market interaction indeed does not presuppose individual rationality as assumed by the 
constructivist models of neoclassical economics. Participants who neither understand the 
general equilibrium model nor have any clear idea of what their counterparts want or do 
nonetheless maximize their profits given the behavior of all others (Smith V. 2005: 137).  
Smith (2005: 137) even reports that the participants themselves “deny that there is any kind of 
quantitative model that could predict their market price and exchange volume, or that they 
were able to maximize their profits.” Vernon Smith (2005: 136, 140) also points at the fact 
that “irrational” agents, that is agents who are not rational in the sense in which game-theorist 
have modeled it, achieve better outcomes in two-person anonymous trust interactions than 
rational agents would.  
The ecological rationality at the heart of the working of the market economy is not at all taken 
into account by standard economics. That its assumptions are not descriptive is an old 
critique; Vernon Smith’s experiments made it clear that they are not even necessary for the 
market to equilibrate. Indeed it seems that there are circumstances where they lead to worse 
results than presumedly irrational agents do. These phenomena, Smith (2005: 136) states, are 
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not “constructively explicable with the tools of standard theory.” In his eyes, economics thus 
is still far away from an adequate explanation of its research object:   
 
In this sense our bounded rationality as economic theorists is far more constraining on 
economic science, than the bounded rationality of privately informed agents is 
constraining on their ability to maximize the gains from exchange in markets (V. 
Smith 2005: 137). 
 
 
4.2 Accounting and its principles as an evolved social institution 
Ecological rationality is not restricted to the working of the market. Rather it can be applied to 
many social-grown institutions. Vernon Smith, although clearly realizing this field of 
application for his concept, did not go beyond the examination of different market 
environments (continuous double auction, sealed bid, posted offer, and others) and their 
influence on market results (V. Smith 2005: 143).  
Carl Menger and Friedrich von Hayek had resumed the Scottish non-constructivist view on 
social phenomena and did not limit it to plain market processes. They applied it more 
generally to the evolution of social institutions. Menger (1892), most notably, explained the 
origin of money as a result of organic and unconscious social processes. Menger (1985: 130) 
also mentions language, law, and states as social institutions which are the “unintended 
product of historical development.” Based on Menger’s groundwork, Friedrich von Hayek 
elaborated on this kind of social evolution. He spoke of institutions and rules of conduct that 
are “the results of human action, but not of human design” (Hayek 1967a).  He laid emphasis 
on the argument that it is not a condition for the effectiveness of such institutions and rules 
that their rationale is understood by any one of its applicants (Hayek 1978: 7; 1967b: 43 ff.).  
The distinction between the constructivist and the ecological rationality of social institutions 
can easily be applied to the formation of accounting and its principles. In recent decades, the 
constructivist approach prevails. In today’s accounting textbooks in the U.S., the history of 
financial accounting routinely starts in 1934, with the formation of the SEC, and its delegation 
of accounting standard-setting to private bodies (Waymire and Basu 2007: 4; Sunder 2005: 
373). The shift towards legislated written and authoritatively enforced standards gathered 
pace in the early 1970’s after the FASB Conceptual Framework project was launched. Biondi 
(2011: 2) even speaks of an “accounting revolution.” Accordingly, accounting researchers 
“almost exclusively use implicit theories of intentional design to analyze accounting practices, 
whether imbedded in regulators’ conceptual frameworks or academics’ comparative static 
analyses” (Waymire and Basu 2007: 1 f.). In other words, the constructivist view is thought to 
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apply. Accounting principles are seen as a product of conscious deliberations and political 
decision-making processes. The standard-setters are supposed to be able to rationally design 
accounting rules.  
It is true: especially since the financial crisis broke out in 2007, but already before, a growing 
amount of critics has bemoaned flaws in the designed accounting standards. Notably the fair 
value principle has been said to be responsible for greater financial fragility of companies and 
banks and has been blamed for exacerbating market bubbles (Boyer 2007; Dichev 2008: 466; 
Yuan and Liu 2011: 18-28). The standard-setters’ policies have been criticized severely, and 
also the fact that the standard-setting process has been delegated to private bodies (Perry and 
Nölke 2006). The reaction to both the experiences made during the crises and the attacks of 
the critics was that the standard-setters revised some of their standards (Ojo 2010). 
However, the view according to which accounting principles are and should be consciously 
designed has been challenged by but a few commentators. Sunder (2005: 373) worries: 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century, few people seem to be aware of the social norm, 
convention, or common law approach of the earlier era, and such an approach has 
hardly any advocates left. 
 
He (2005: 372) argues that the world of accounting did not have less order in the days before 
authoritative standards were set. There were business and professional norms that had 
developed over time and that regulated accounting in a more informal way.  
That the traditional accounting principles have not been consciously designed, but emerged 
spontaneously in a process of several centuries, is also argued by Byrne (1965: 107), Huerta 
de Soto (2012: xxvi-xxix) and Waymire and Basu (2007: 1 f.). To be sure, the argument is not 
that design and evolution of social norms are mutually exclusive and that, therefore, the 
traditional accounting principles have never been designed by anyone (Sunder 2005: 375 f.). 
At one time, there must have been the first person who actually applied conservatism in 
accounting. Furthermore, the treatises of some famous writers, like Luca Pacioli or Jacques 
Savary, and, likewise, important legislative texts, like the French Code de Commerce or the 
Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht, influenced accounting practices for centuries. The point is 
that, throughout the course of history, numerous differing accounting principles have been 
designed and put to the test, but only few of them stood the test of time and came down to our 
days. Competition among different accounting principles has eliminated those rules that 
adversely affected the health of the businesses appying them, so that the principles that won 
through were best adapted to guarantee the survival of the applying businesses (Byrne 1965: 
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109; Salin 2010: 58). Competition, in Hayek’s (2002) terminology, served as a “discovery 
procedure” in the area of accounting rules. 
From this point of view, the practice of the international standard-setters has to be criticized 
for two reasons. First, they seem to ignore the historical evidence for the evolutionary 
dominance of the revenue-expense approach – its ecological rationality – and thus provoke a 
further painful empirical rebuttal of the balance-sheet principle. Second, in making their view 
mandatory all over the world, they rule out competition among different accounting systems 
that could reveal advances in accounting rules.  
 
4.3 Is a rational reconstruction possible?  
The institution of accounting and its principles has actually evolved in a very long process. 
Nobody decided on the question as to which way of record-keeping is the best or most 
successful one. Instead, social evolution has shown which accounting principles have stood 
the test of time. However, as a consequence of the nearly exclusive emphasize of 
constructivist rationality in accounting research, “we understand virtually nothing about how 
the important institution of accounting evolves spontaneously” (Waymire and Basu 2007: 2). 
But even though we are not able to determine why exactly accounting norms developed the 
way they did – as shown above, these norms were not purposefully designed by anyone – we 
may be able to rationally reconstruct some reasons for their evolution (Smith V. 2003: 470). 
Of special interest is the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: Why did those 
accounting principles win through that resemble economic behavior as observed by 
behavioral economics, and not others which are more compatible with the assumptions of 
neoclassical economics? 
Unfortunately, no precise answer can be given. Social norms, as Sunder (2005: 371) rightly 
observes, unfortunately “leave nary a footprint in the public record.” We can only conjecture 
that individual behavior which fulfills the assumptions of rational choice theory is not 
necessarily the behavior which prevails in evolution, neither for humans in the evolution of 
species nor for companies in the social context of the market economy. A graphical, though 
probably not the most sensitive illustration can be given if one thinks of professors of game 
theory, physics, or math. Nobody would deny that what they are doing is a valuable 
contribution to society, and most would agree that if there are people who can think rationally, 
one would have to look for them among these professors. But it seems equally clear that the 
truly inhuman consistency, transitivity, and rationality that these persons might be able to 
display does not in any way help them to be successful “out in the world,” neither in the 
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jungle nor in the market. It could even be argued that their quest for rationality interferes with 
their ambitions. Hayek, the champion of ecological rationality, again and again pointed out 
that conscious rationality only plays a minor part in human actions and decisions, and we 
should be glad therefore:   
 
If we stopped doing everything for which we do not know the reason, or for which we 
cannot provide a justification […] we would probably soon be dead (Hayek 1988: 68). 
 
Individual rationality might be important in some instances, but it is definitely not the only or 
even the most important factor of success.   
Take the example of sunk costs. Most of us know and understand the rationality of the 
argument as to why sunk costs should not influence our decisions. Nonetheless, all of us have 
committed and continue to commit the “mistake” of not ignoring past costs in what we do, 
especially at times when we occasionally forget about the argument. Does this mean that we 
all are irrational? Couldn’t it be that, for some unknown reason, those of our ancestors who 
did not ignore sunk costs had an edge over those who presumedly were more rational? If this 
were the case, the fact that traditional accounting norms imply the use of sunk costs in the 
form of historical costs might indicate that this rule contains tacit knowledge that we have not 
yet any clear idea of.  
The case seems to be more clear for conservatism. It is not inconceivable at all that, from an 
evolutionary perspective, it is a prudent code of conduct to lay more stress on the avoidance 
of pain than on the attainment of pleasure. Needless to say that survival is a pre-condition of 
enjoying pleasure and therefore the more important of the two. An accounting rule which 
makes the entrepreneur feel losses earlier than profits would likewise induce him to avoid 
losses more than he would otherwise do. It might be a rule that does not guarantee the short-
term maximization of profit, but it might instead enhance the probability of survival in the 
market.         
It goes without saying that this discussion only contains hints and conjectures on why the 
evolved accounting norms have become what they are. It should have become clear, however, 
that an argument can be made that they are ecologically rational. Although we don’t 
understand completely how and why they work, we can see that they actually have worked 
and that they won through in competition with other rules. What remains to be done – and this 
is the major part of the work – is to reconstruct this ecological rationally in more detail. What 
difference does it make for the market economy according as companies apply the balance-
sheet or the revenue-expense view in accounting?  
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Hayek’s (1945) view of the working of the price system might serve as a starting point for the 
corresponding research program. He argued that neoclassical economics totally 
misunderstands its rationale. This system does not presuppose extraordinary amounts of 
knowledge or rationality on the part of the market participants, as neoclassical theory 
assumes. Instead, the price system generates knowledge about the relative scarcities in 
society. Every individual only needs the “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time 
and place” (Hayek 1945: 521), not more. Thus, private information is the input and public 
information is the output of the market process.  
This view of the market process backs the traditional revenue-expense approach. One could 
argue that it is not necessary nor even meaningful that the individual balance sheet contains 
publicly useful information. This kind of information is only generated by the market process 
and the input of the latter is private information of the circumstances of time and place. And 
this is exactly what income figures based on historical cost accounting reveal: private and new 
information. Historical costs inform us about the amount of money that has been paid by one 
particular firm for an asset at one point in the past, and the corresponding income figures tell 
us how much profit this firm has made out of it. Why it did so remains its secret. Possibly, 
nobody else would ever have paid that amount for this particular asset and made this profit. 
Because of this, the profit thus revealed contains new and private information. It is based on 
the actual actions of the respective firm, and in its actions, a firm necessarily considers its 
specific “knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.” Thus, profit based on 
historical cost figures in income statements can serve as information input to the market 
process. 
No new information is generated, however, when, as in fair value accounting, the market 
value of an asset is shown in the balance sheet and the increase of the market value in the 
income statement. To depict the increase of the market value of an asset provides no new 
information to the market. It is the result of the market process, that is, of the actions of the 
other market participants, not an information input of any sort. From a market process point 
of view, Hicksian Income N° 1, the ideal of the adherents of the balance-sheet approach, does 
not provide new information but instead presupposes that the necessary information is already 
provided by the market.   
It can further be argued that other accounting principles, like conservatism, can easily be 
reconciled with Hayek’s view of the price system. The individual market participant’s attitude 
towards risk, losses, and gains, whether “rational” or not, is simply part of the private 
information that enters the market process. There is no reason why the possibility to 
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coordinate the plans of the market participants should depend on the anxiety with which they 
calculate their profit. Conservative plans can be coordinated in the same way as optimistic or 
realistic ones. The market outcome probably differs, but not its efficiency.     
 
5. Conclusion 
What is behind the traditional accounting principles? This paper has proposed a direction for 
further research on this question. The revenue-expense approach and especially the principles 
of historical cost and conservatism have been shown to bear a close resemblance to human 
behavior as demonstrated by Prospect Theory. Whether this is rational or not, people do not 
ignore sunk costs and they value gains and losses differently. Furthermore, they evaluate the 
results of their actions as changes relative to a reference point, not as the difference between 
two individually valuated states of wealth. In addition, it has been demonstrated that it does 
not necessarily have to be a problem when accounting is conducted according to principles 
which do not conform to the assumptions of neoclassical economics. In fact, that the revenue-
expense approach primarily incorporates private information makes it congenial to a market 
process view of the price system.  
The defense of the historically evolved accounting principles and the critique of the balance 
sheet approach endorsed by the standard-setters do not imply a call for an unconditional 
return to the former. Nobody knows where the evolution of accounting will lead in the 
coming decades and which principles will become necessary. However, what is implied is a 
critique of the standard-setting process as such. The establishment and enforcement of 
accounting standards nearly all over the world have destroyed the competition among 
different accounting principles not only on a national, but also on an international level. 
Ecological rationality has been pushed back as a source of wisdom; instead, constructivist 
rationality has taken its place. It is to be hoped that the arguments presented in this paper help 
to allay fears of leaving the development of accounting norms to social evolution and to raise 
doubts about the necessity for standard-setters to create standards from scratch. 
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